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Daniel F. Potter* Unemployment Insurance:




Ever since the 1940 amendment to the BNA Act' which gave
exclusive jurisdiction in relation to unemployment insurance to
Parliament, the thrust of Canada's unemployment compensation
system and the basis for its eligibility conditions has been that the
claimant must be unemployed through no fault of his own. 2 The
primary purpose of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 19713 was
put succinctly in a recent decision of the Umpire:
... it is not the function of the Unemployment Insurance Act to
provide public welfare, but rather to provide aid of a temporary
nature to a claimant who is actively seeking work and capable of
performing work of a nature which may be available and who
through no fault of his own is unable to find it. CUB 34474
Because of this limited legislative objective, unemployment
insurance cannot be seen as a panacea for all the ills of economic
disadvantage, but is only part of a broader spectrum of social
*Daniel F. Potter, Third Year Law Student, Dalhousie University.
This article is based on a paper prepared for credit in Professor Innis Christie's
Employment Law Seminar in the Spring of 1975. It should be emphasized that this
paper could not have been written without the assistance of the Halifax office of the
Unemployment Insurance Commission. However, the views of the author are not
necessarily those of the Commission and indeed, the Commission takes issue with
certain of the author's assessments of the extent of the discretion and flexibility of
action possessed by Commission officers.
1. Section 91 (2A) added by British North American Act 1940, 3-4 Geo. VI, c. 36
(U.K.); R.S.C. 1970 App. No. 27.
2. Involuntary unemployment has also been the basis for compensation in England
and in the federally aided state administered programs in the United States: see for
example, D. Packard, Unemployment without Fault: Disqualifications of
Unemployment Insurance Benefits (1971-72), 17 Vill. L. Rev. 635.
3. S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 48.
4. All appeals from administrative decisions under the Unemployment Insurance
Act are, in the first instance, to a Board of Referrees (S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 48, s. 94
(1)) and thereafter a final appeal may be had under certain conditions (ss. 95 and
96) to a Federal Court Judge sitting as an Umpire. His decisions are reported by a
CUB number and are final except insofar as there is a right to judicial review under
the Federal Court Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 1. (See s. 100 of the Unemployment
Insurance Act.)
Unemployment Insurance 179
legislation, including worker's compensation, social assistance, old
age pensions and disability relief programs. It is not surprising,
therefore, that all the unemployment insurance acts since 1940 have
had provisions restricting eligibility in such cases as: (1) voluntary
separation 5, (2) loss of employment through misconduct6 ; (3)
unavailability for work7 ; and (4) refusal of suitable employment8 .
However, notwithstanding that the remedial intent of unemploy-
ment insurance is limited and imposes definite boundaries in
relation to the classes of persons who will be compensated, there is
also a compelling interest in having those boundaries determined
fairly and in alleviating the economic hardship of claimants falling
within them promptly and efficiently.9
Inasmuch as the Unemployment Insurance Commission is
charged with the administration of the Unemployment Insurance
Act, 10 the job of striking a balance between relieving against
involuntary unemployment and protecting the integrity of a program
falls squarely in its lap. Considering the veritable multitude of
claims which the Commission must process,' 1 the proper
determination of eligibility in each case becomes no mean task. As a
result administrative realities weigh heavily and in practice the
enforcement of the eligibility provisions of the Act become,
perforce, largely a matter of policy.
In these circumstances, it is plain that specific disqualification
provisions such as those mentioned above 12 cannot properly be
assessed as purely legal issues; if their real effect upon claimants is
5. S.C. 1940, c. 44, s. 43; R.S.C. 1970, c. U-2, s. 60(1), (1955 Act); S.C.
1970-71-72, c. 48, s. 41(1).
6. Id.
7. S.C. 1940, c. 44, s. 29(1); R.S.C. 1970, c. U-2, s. 54(2) (a), (1955 Act); S.C.
1970-71-72, c. 48, s. 25 (a)
8. S.C. 1940, c. 44, s. 42; R.S.C. 1970, c. U-2, s. 59(1), (1955 Act; S.C.
1970-71-72, c. 48, s. 40(1).
9. See 33rd. Annual Report of the Unemployment Insurance Commission, at P. 3.
This report covers the period from January 1, 1973 to December 31, 1973 to
December 31, 1973 and was prepared in compliance with the Unemployment
Insurance Act, 1971, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 48, s. 130(1).
10. S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 48, s. 6. Hereinafter the Unemployment Insurance Act
will be referred to as the "Act" and citations will be given by section number only.
Similarly, the Unemployment Insurance Commission will be referred to as the
"Commission" or "UIC".
11. In 1973 the Commission paid out $2,004 million in net benefit payments:
33rd. Annual Report, supra, note 9 at 11.
12. Supra, notes 5-8.
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to be determined, they are better evaluated in their administrative,
as well as their legal, dimension. Assuming the validity of this
opinion, it is the purpose of this paper to analyse some of the major
issues of eligibility on the basis of both UIC policy and legal
principle as reflected in Umpire decisions. The discussion will
center on those areas already enumerated, namely voluntary
separation, misconduct, availability, and suitable employment. The
equally important subjects of unemployment arising out of illness,
labour disputes and pregnancy' 3 are omitted for reasons of
economy.
Before setting out each area individually, further discussion by
way of introduction to the Unemployment Insurance Commission is
in order. Here, the concern will be with what is known in UIC
circles as the "Benefit Control Function".
H. The Benefit Control Function
The UIC policy manual 14 describes the functional structure of the
organization as consisting of a continuous spectrum of activities
which fall into three segments in the Commission, namely:
insurance, benefit control and special investigation. The boundary
or limitations of the middle or benefit control group is defined by
setting the limits of the insurance group and the special investigation
group. The manual goes on to point out that, in actual practice,
these limits or boundaries are not rigidly defined. Indeed, as far as
working relationships are concerned, many of the benefit control
officers' leads concerning deliberate abuse will arise through the
observations or suspicions of insurance officers. Similarly, many of
the leads for special investigators will come from benefit control
officers' observations and findings. 15
In stating its benefit control policy the Commission concedes that
there is no known way of determining with 100% accuracy which
claimants are deliberately abusing the unemployment insurance
scheme. Consequently, the manual recognizes that benefit control
investigation may be carried out in many cases where the claimant
or employer is honestly fulfilling all his obligations under the Act.
13. See ss. 25(b), 44 and 46 of the Act.
14. Canada Unemployment Insurance Commission, Manuic 1: Policy Guidelines
(amended) (Ottawa: October, 1973). The Manuic series of manuals are used in the
training of officers and for subsequent reference.
15. Id. at2.16 and 2.14.
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Accordingly, the Commission directs its employees to:
(1) Select in such a way that the investigations cover areas of
probable deliberate abuse;
(2) Investigate in such a way that all facts are obtained without
harassment, whether intentional or otherwise;
(3) Record the results of the investigation objectively such that an
Insurance Officer, A Board of Referees, or an Umpire can reach a
correct decision. 
16
The methods to be used in selection of caseloads which are
endorsed by the Commission are:
(1) Random sampling.
(2) Discriminate selection, i.e. where employment market informa-
tion indicates that employment is potentially to be found, and
hence indicates a high probability of abuse amongst long term
claimants who qualify for such work.
(3) Computer matching programs, e.g. monthly file match with
Canada Pension Plan, the Adult Occupational Training Act file
matching program, and the Local Initiatives Program (LIP) file
match.
(4) Leads from third parties and from labour market information
and from insurance officers indicate claimants very likely to be
abusing the program.
Policy states that priority is to be given to methods 3 and 4 since
there is a strong indication that an abuse has been committed. 
17
It will be seen from the above that the benefit control function, as
it relates to eligibility provisions, is selective in nature and does not
purport to scrutinize every claim for possible disentitlement or
disqualification. This policy (or administrative reality) by itself is
probably more relevant to claimants than any substantive rule
relating to eligibility. However, the admittedly imperfect system of
abuse detection should not occasion a sense of security in would-be
abusive claimants, for as will be seen in the discussion of the
individual elegibility restrictions which follows, the benefit control
function has other, more ongoing, facets which follow claims from
application to termination.
16. Id. at 5.16.
17. Id. at 6.16.
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III. Voluntary Leaving and Misconduct
The Act states:
s.41(1) A claimant is disqualified from receiving benefits ... if
he lost his employment by reason of his own misconduct or if he
voluntary left his employment without just cause.
The duration of a period of disqualification under that section is
three weeks running 18 consecutively with the two week waiting
period' 9 and benefits are deemed to have been paid during the
disqualification.
20
It is worth noting that a proposed amendment to the Act,
introduced in 1973, would have disqualified a claimant from
receiving benefits until he had eight or more weeks of insurable
employment after the day he voluntarily left his employment or lost
it through misconduct. 21 Even under the 1940 and 1955 acts the
maximum period for disqualification was six weeks.
22
From the basis of the general legislative purpose of only
compensating those persons involuntarily unemployed through no
fault of their own, several related theories have been suggested to
explain the reasoning behind the specific disqualification for
voluntary separation and misconduct. One American author,
writing about similar provisions in the unemployment compensation
schemes in her country, has proffered three: the penalty theory, the
actuarial theory, and the causal theory.
23
To the present writer, the differences among Ms. Kempfer's
theories are more apparent than real, the only real grounds for
differentiation being the placing of emphasis. While the penalty




21. Bill C-125, S. 10.. Introduced January 17, 1973 by Hon. Robert Andras,
Minister of Manpower and Immigration, to the 1st Session, 29th Parliament, 21
Elizabeth II, 1973, House of Commons.
22. S.C. 1940, c. 44, s. 46(1) and R.S.C. 1970, c. U-2, s. 62.. Since this paper
was written a proposed amendment to the Act which would inter alia extend the
disqualification period of six weeks once again was introduced by the Minister of
Manpower and Immigration as Bill C-69, s. 16; 1st Session, 30th Parliament,
23-24 Elizabeth II, 1974-75, House of Commons (First reading, July 8, 1975).
The main thrust of Bill C-69 is to alter the classes of persons eligible for benefits
and it also contains other "housekeeping" amendments, none of which affect the
areas dealt with in this paper other than as herein stated.
23. See K. Kempfer, Disqualifications for Voluntary Leaving and Misconduct
(1945), 55 Yale L.J. 147.
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actuarial theory is more concerned with the allocation of available
funds to the most deserving (though not necessarily the neediest)
claimants and excluding the least deserving. The causal theory, on
the other hand, stresses the period of disqualification provided by
the statute, calling it: ". . . the legislative judgment of how long the
initial cause of the individual's unemployment continues to be the
dominating cause." 24
If there is any merit at all at all in theorizing about these
disqualifications, it might be that it at least sheds some light on the
proposed amendments to the disqualification period (supra). On the
basis of the causal theory it could be argued that the adoption of
either the eight week or six week requirement would be unduly
harsh and contrary to the basic philosophy of the Act.
In other words, where a person is actively seeking work,
unemployment for a period longer than is usually required for any
change of jobs is more likely due to unfavourable labour market
conditions than to separation from a previous job.2 5 Therefore,
refusal of benefits to such claimants amounts to a penalty which
endures long after the voluntary separation or misconduct has
ceased to be the proximate cause of the claimant's unemployment.
In this sense, the claimant is being denied compensation even
though he is unemployed through no fault of his own. It is therefore
submitted that after the disqualifying act has ceased to be the
proximate cause of a claimant's unemployment, his eligibility for
benefits should be tested by the availability requirement (infra). 2 6
Before turning to the substantive issues involved in voluntary
separation and misconduct, a brief discussion of UIC policy in
relation to those areas is in order.
In its policy guidelines, the Commission directs that the benefit
control function will only become involved in the investigation of
voluntary quits or misconducts where there is an obvious need for a
more in depth investigation 27 as, for instance, when questioning
24. Id. at 151.
25. Id.
26. Kempfer, supra, note 23, at 152, reaches the same conclusion However, this
reasoning notwithstanding, Bill C-69, if enacted, will increase the disqualification
period, albeit not for as long as proposed in Bill C-125 but still, it is submitted, for
an unduly long period.
27. The kind of further investigation contemplated and the type of questions asked
are contained in UIC manuals, sample interview questions etc., which have been
deleted from the published version of this paper at the behest of the Commission.
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indicates withholding of information; where information obtained
requires verification of records; where the circumstances give rise to
doubt as to the claimant's past entitlement, etc . . . . Also, as a
matter of caseload selection, the Commission places greater
emphasis on the detection of claimants who separate voluntarily
without just cause than on those who lose their employment through
misconduct.
28
In cases where grounds for disqualification have been estab-
lished, the Commission directs that there is good and sufficient
reason to require further proof of availability before allowing the
claimant to serve his waiting period and commence receiving
benefits. In addition, the guidlines state, there are also grounds for
the Commission to require the claimant to prove that he is unable to
obtain suitable employment. 
29
Even after a claimant has served his disqualification period under
s. 43(1), he is still subject to special scrutiny by the Commission.
For example, agents are directed to require a claimant who has
voluntarily quit or has been discharged for misconduct to continue
in the Active Job Search Program30 for an indefinite period of time
and to report to the District Office to discuss subsequent Job Search
Statements at least once every four weeks.
As will be seen from the discussion of the availability provisions
(infra), neither the Active Job Search nor the reporting requirement
is always mandatory. That they should become compulsory for the
duration of a claimant's eligibility because of an initial disqualifica-
tion is perhaps sufficient to raise the inference that the unenacted
provisions of Bill C-125, discussed above, are nevertheless being
carried out to some extent by virtue of administrative edict. The
argument used against the proposed legislative attempt to penalize
claimants after their unemployment became bona fide applies a
fortiori to an administrative attempt to do so.31
Let us now direct our attention to a more specific analysis of the
elements of voluntary separation and misconduct:
28. Canada Unemployment Insurance Commission, Manuic 1: Policy Guidelines
(amended), supra note 14 at 2.9.
29. Id. at 1.9
30. The Active Job Search Program will be explained in connection with the
availability requirement.
31. Of course, it can always be said on behalf of the Commission that the
requirement of participating in an Active Job Search Program and reporting does
not amount to a disqualification for benefits.
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1. Voluntary Separation
For purposes of a disqualification for voluntary separation (and
for misconduct) under s. 41(1), "employment" refers to the
claimant's last employment immediately prior to the time of his
claim for benefits (s. 41(3)). However, under Reg. 174, if the last
employment terminated more than thirteen weeks prior to the time
of a claim for benefits it is not employment for purposes of s. 41(1)
and no disqualification may be imposed for voluntary leaving in
such circumstances. On the other hand, if the last employment prior
to a claim for benefit is for a period of less than five days, then the
employment immediately prior to that last employment may be
deemed to be the last employment of the Claimant (Reg. 174(2)).
The "thirteenth week" regulation appears to take into account
the causal theory of disqualification (supra) inasmuch as it does not
seek to penalize a claimant for a voluntary separation which has
ceased to be the dominating cause of his unemployment. By the
same token, the "five day" provision ensures that a claimant cannot
set up an intervening sham employment in order to avoid a
disqualification which would otherwise be imposed by reason of
voluntary separation.
Once it is determined whether the employment in question is one
which the voluntary leaving therefrom will give rise to a
disqualification, the threshold issues become whether there has been
a "leaving" and, if so, whether it was "voluntary".
It is clear that "leaving employment" refers only to the
serverance of the employment relationship and does not include a
temporary interruption in the performance of services. 32 To
properly be termed a "leaving", a separation has to at least have as
its objective a final separation of the relationship between employer
and employee (CUB 760, CUB 1050). 33 Accordingly, where a
claimant was on leave of absence for the purpose of taking care of
her sick mother, it was held that she had not "left" her employment
(although it was found that she was unavailable for work) (CUB
1781). On the other hand, where a claimant gave notice that she was
taking a three week vacation to which she was not entitled and
32. See Kempfer, supra, note 23 at 154.
33. Most of the CUBs used in this paper are cited in: Canada Unemployment
Insurance Commission, Digest of Benefit Entitlement Principles: Technical
Handbook Number 8 (Revision) (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1973). Others are
taken directly from the full reports of: Decisions of the Umpire, bound volumes of
which are published yearly by UIC.
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which caused her dismissal, such absence was held to be tantamount
to voluntary leaving without just cause (CUB 895).
As to voluntariness, where the employer has taken the initiative
the separation is not voluntary (CUB 2004). But where the claimant
takes the iniative, he is deemed to have left voluntarily regardless of
whether he would ordinarily have preferred to stay or not (CUB
1572). In other words, Umpire decisions have refused to regard the
element of volition in voluntary leaving as anything but the other
side of the coin from where the claimant has been discharged by the
employer. This is in contradistinction to some American benefit
decisions which have held that leaving was involuntary in cases
where there was a definite risk to health or safety, an inability to
obtain transportation, or an inability to secure adequate housing.
34
But the fact that Canadian jurisprudence in relation to the
meaning of the word "voluntary" is not so finely tuned as its
American counterpart does not mean that the American decisions in
that regard are inherently more favourable to claimants. Inasmuch
as the ultimate issue in voluntary leaving cases is whether or not the
claimant has quit for good cause, the same result is usually reached
regardless of how one treats the voluntariness question. For
example, in one of the American decisions just referred to, no
disqualification was imposed on the grounds that leaving for health
reasons was involuntary; Canadian decisions have consistently
reached the same result on the basis that, while voluntary, leaving
for health reasons can constitute good cause (CUB 775, CUB 1708,
CUB 2171).
There may, however, be an extra evideniary burden on claimants
because of the narrow Canadian interpretation of voluntariness.
This arises out of the fact that the onus of proving just cause for
leaving is only placed on the claimant after the insurance officer
establishes that the claimant voluntarily left his employment (CUB
1150). If the American position were followed there would at least
be logical grounds for saying than no disqualification could be
imposed until the insurance officer had proved that a claimant's
leaving, where, say, health reasons are alleged, was voluntary; and
only then after the claimant had been given adequate opportunity to
show good cause.
While this incongruity between Canadian and American benefit
decisions is interesting as a means of pointing out what a common
34. Kempfer, supra, note 23 at 155. See also, Packard, supra, note 2 at 641.
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lawyer might call the relative unsophistication of the former, it
should be borne in mind that many of the American decisions find
their way to the ordinary courts35 whereas, as has already been
noted, Canadian decisions virtually never are appealed beyond the
Umpire. 36 The present writer does not suggest that the American
jurisprudence should be emulated in this regard (or with regard to
benefit decisions, generally, for that matter). Rather the importance
of the comparison is that, as a matter of statutory construction, if
voluntariness is not going to be given a wide and liberal
interpretation, then "good cause" should be read so as to provide
employees with a sufficient range of grounds for severing the
employment relationship without being disqualified for benefits.
The actual range of voluntary leaving sitations in which good
cause can be proffered by claimants as a bar to disqualification
includes situations in which their voluntary leaving arose out of
circumstances such as: changes in, and existing conditions of,
employment; changes in wages; changes in hours or days; changes
in working conditions (including danger); illness in the family;
housing problems; marriage religious objections; opportunities to
take courses; employment contract fulfilled; transportation difficul-
ties; and ill health or preganancy.
In considering conditions of employment, there is a large area
which overlaps the disqualification for refusal of suitable
employment (infra). One would expect, for example, that a worker
would not be disqualified for leaving work which he might have
refused to accept on the ground of unsuitability.3 7 But the
authorities have held that the fact that the employment might be
considered unsuitable if it were being offered to the claimant does
not in itself create just cause for leaving if the claimant has either
accepted the employment, knowing all the circumstances, or has
continued in it for any lengthy period of time (CUB 781).
It is
... (a) basically important principle ... that an employee who
is dissatisfied with the existing condition of his employment is
justified in leaving it only after he has made every effort to have
the situation remedied, including the means provided by law, or
after he has taken steps to obtain reasonable prospects of other
work, unless the conditions of the employment are so
35. Id.
36. Supra, note4.
37. This the usual rule in American benefit decisions: see Kempfer, supra, note 23
at 157.
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unsatisfactory that he has no alternative but to leave (CUB
1893).
On the other hand, a claimant will not be disqualified for leaving
unsuitable employment where, on a trial basis, he had accepted that
employment knowing that doubtful or less favourable conditions of
work existed (CUB 490, CUB 781). For example, having given it a
fair trial, an accountant had just cause to leave as unsuitable
employment a job as a truck driver (CUB 2233).
The same reasoning applies to situations where there have been
changes in an employment which had theretofore been suitable. In
that case, the employee may not have just cause for leaving unless it
is shown that the new employment is unsuitable, notwithstanding
that the new duties are outside the orginal terms of the contract of
service (CUB 844).
Similarly, changes in wages and hours or days of work do not
automatically give an employee the right to leave his employment
and become entitled to benefits. In keeping with the thrust of CUB
1893 (supra), an employee faced with such changes is expected to
stay with the employment complained of until he can find
something better or until the working conditions become intolerable
(CUB 1471).
This policy in favour of continuity of employment, perhaps
unconsciously, seems to inhibit the mobility of labour and tends to
penalize the worker by effectively tying him to an employer who
has changed the rules in the middle of the game. It is suggested that
in no case where the worker would be justified in leaving on the
basis of the terms of the relationship between himself and his
employer should he be unable to show just cause.
Besides the possibility of being unable to show just cause for
leaving for reasons directly related to the employment relationship,
a claimant may also be entitled to leave his job without
disqualification on more personal grounds. Hence, serious illness in
the claimant's family, which necessitates his presence at home, is
just cause for voluntarily leaving employment, provided that it can
be established that the claimant's own presence at home is essential
and that it is not feasible to arrange to leave of absence (CUB 727,
CUB 3097).
Inability to procure accomodation and the lack of transportation
facilities may also constitute just cause for leaving a job; but, in the
case of housing, a claimant will normally be obliged to take separate
lodgings for himself if the family can be accomodated elsewhere
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(CUB 346, CUB 430) unless such an arragnement would cause a
prolonged separation from his family (CUB 1102). Likewise, if an
employee is faced with a lack of means of travelling from his home
to the job, he will generally be required to take remedial action
regarding his lack of transporation (CUB 543) or move nearer to
his place of employment until other means of transportation can be
obtained (CUB 346). However, it was held that there was just cause
for leaving where the car owner had quit and the cost of boarding
nearer the job was too high in relation to the wages (CUB 2410), or
where the only alternative transportation would cost $12 a day by
taxi (CUB 2725) ( although the appropriate question in such cases is
whether the claimant can prove availability (CUB 2726).
Generally, leaving employment for the purpose of attending a
course of instruction is not considered to be leaving with good cause
(CUB 2491), but where a claimant does so only after being referred
to the course by the Commission or Canada Manpower, good cause
is shown (CUB 3370).
Benefit decisions relating to marriage share a common feature
with many laws relating to that institution - a woman stands to
gain pecuniary benefits by being treated unequally. Specifially,
because a wife is deemed to have a legal and a moral obligation to
live with her husband where he has established his domicile (CUB
612), she cannot be disqualified for benefits for leaving her job to
accompany him, even if it is in a location where there are no
reasonable opportunities of employment for the wife (CUB 640).
While this realization will probably not daunt the efforts of those in
the vanguard of the women's liberation movement, it may well
compromise those whose zealousness is divided between a concern
for emancipation and a desire to be in receipt of unemployment
insurance benefits.
Religious objections, however, cut across all sex lines and any
employee has the right to act in accordance with religious beliefs,
honestly held; but a claimant is admonished "not to act too hastily
before making himself acquainted with all the circumstances"
(CUB 964).
Since the new Act (1971) persons who are forced to leave their
jobs for reasons of illness or pregnancy have been entitled to
benefits. Whereas it is not within the terms of reference of this paper
to discuss these subjects, 38 it suffices to say that leaving for either
38. Entitlement to sickness benefits has been dealt with quite extensively by: D.
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reason constitutes just cause so long as adequate evidence is
adduced.
2. Misconduct
The rationale for disqualification from receipt of benefits for
becoming unemployed through misconduct is the same as for
voluntary separation - the claimant is not unemployed through no
fault of his own. Indeed, the misconduct and voluntary separation
provisions are contained in the same section of the Act (s. 41(1))
and the same three week disqualification period is imposed for both
(s. 43(1)). Therefore, much of the above discussion relating to
voluntary separation, and especially the portion about the theories
of disqualification, is equally applicable to the present analysis.
There is, however, one practical difference which must be
reiterated. As was stated above the Commission has made a policy
decision to de-emphasize the imposition of a disqualification on
claimants whose claim statements indicate that they have been
discharged for misconduct. Although no express rationalization was
given for this policy, the present writer suggests that it stems from
the difficult onus of proof and the consequent heavy investigative
and adjudicative demands placed on the Commission in such cases.
Before he can impose a disqualification for misconduct an
insurance officer must be satisfied that there is conclusive evidence
on each issue involved. Therefore in all cases where misconduct is
alleged, it can be said with authority that: (1) The act complained of
must clearly be established as an act for which the claimant is
personally responsible (CUB 1611, CUB 963). (2) It must be
clearly established that the act amounts to misconduct (CUB 1079,
CUB 1611). (3) It must be established that the claimant was
discharged for the act in question and not for some previous conduct
which has no immediate relation to the alleged reason for dismissal
(CUB 25, CUB 1079). If we look briefly at each of these issues the
reader will get some sense of what is involved in a finding of
misconduct as well as an opportunity to decide for himself whether
this writer's contention regarding the Commission's reason for its
laissezfaire policy re misconduct is well founded. Throughout this
discussion it should be borne in mind that the UIC has jurisdiction to
make a determination on misconduct for compensation purposes
Risely, An Introduction to the Position of the Sick Employee in Canada,
(unpublished manuscript, Dalhousie Law School, 1975.) See especially 21-28.
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alone and its decision can have no effect on other tribunals which
may deal with the matter for different reasons. 39
A finding that the claimant did the act alleged, then, cannot be
based on vague allegations by the employer, for to do so would be
an abdication of jurisdiction by the deciding authority in favour of
the employer (CUB 117, CUB 843, CUB 1079). Futhermore, when
the evidence is conflicting or inconclusive, the benefit of a
reasonable doubt must be given to the claimant (CUB 405, CUB
581, CUB 702, CUB 2013, CUB 2047) and hearsay evidence
cannot be accepted as conclusive (CUB 748, CUB 1224). On the
other hand, a judicial finding in court (but not the mere laying of the
charge) may be proof that the claimant did the act alleged (CUB
101). Similarly, the decision of an arbitrator investigating an
alleged breach of rules may be proof, although such decisions are
not necessarily binding (CUB 1763, CUB 2040).
Once the claimant is found to be responsible for the act in
question, the most difficult issue is to determine whether that act
amounts to "misconduct" within the meaning of the Act. The range
of possible acts which may amount to misconduct is somewhat
narrowed by the fact that the term "misconduct" as used in the Act
means misconduct in its industrial sense and is not to be confused
with breaches of moral or ethical codes or of the criminal law as
such. 40 The problem still remains, however, as to what standard is
to be used to measure the claimant's conduct.
The obvious answer, of course, is that the standard to be applied
is that of the employment contract, express or implied, which fixes
the employee's duties in connection with his work. 41 Indeed, this
test has been firmly adopted by the Umpire to the extent that a
breach of rules and regulations is deemed to be misconduct, even if
the particular rule in question is commonly broken (CUB 584, CUB
3117). For example, a factory worker who punched the time cards
of some fellow employees was found to have lost his employment
by reason of his own misconduct (CUB 3117).
However, in keeping with the Commission's duty to make its
own decisions as to what constitutes misconduct, a breach of
39. Kempfer, supra, note 28 at 160.
40.Canada Unemployment Insurance Commission Digest of Benefit Entitlement
Principles: Technical Handbook Number 8 (Revision), supra, note 32 at para.
1.700.
41. The terms of the employment contract are also used in American decisions as a
standard for determining misconduct: see Kempfer, supra, note 23 at 163.
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employers' rules and regulations does not always amount to
misconduct, as for instance when the rules or regulations impose
undue restrictions or deal with matters outside the scope of the
employee's employment and bear no relationship to his particular
job. Hence, a machine molder who, while on leave of absence,
engaged in picketing another employer's plant, was arrested for
obstruction, fined and sentenced to seven days in jail, was not
deemed to have committed misconduct in its industrial sense even
though his employer had discharged him by virtue of a rule to the
effect that an employee could be dismissed for serving a jail
sentence (CUB 1044).
Even where an employer's rules, such as those applicable to the
operation of railways, are made very strict in the interest of public
safety, and its employees are subject to suspension or dismissal for
causes which in other industries would not carry such severe
penalties, it does not necessarily follow that a dismissal under those
rules would amount to misconduct under the Act (CUB 963).
Accordingly, while misconduct was found on the part of a
conductor who failed to ensure that the minimum interval between
trains was maintained as prescribed by the operating rules (CUB
1877); where there was no evidence of a mandatory rule requiring a
fireman to control the speed of the train or to draw the engineman's
attention to the restricted speed requirement, a disqualification was
not upheld (CUB 2834).
Another major ground for disqualification, somewhat connected
to the failure to obey rules and regulations, and which also helps to
set out standards for misconduct is the failure or refusal to obey
orders or instructions. In cases where an employee refuses or fails to
obey instructions, the question as to whether or not the failure or
refusal amounts to misconduct for compensation purposes depends
upon whether the order or instruction was reasonable. If the order
was not a reasonable one, there is no misconduct (CUB 159, CUB
1464). Hence, a driver salesman who refused to canvass for new
customers was properly disqualified for benefits after being
discharged by his employer (CUB 189). But query whether he
would have been if calling upon established customers constituted a
reasonably full workload.
Other common reasons for dismissal which raise the misconduct
issue are: absence, tardiness, and drinking. Dismissal for being
absent includes cases where the worker, having attended at the
employer's works, goes home before time without permission, or
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leaves work during working hours. As a general rule, in order to
constitute misconduct absence from work must be both wilful and
without permission (CUB 1417, CUB 1945). However, repeated
absences without leave and after warnings, though not necessarily
wilful, constitutes misconduct (CUB 521, CUB 973).
Ancillary to the employee's duty not to be wilfully absent is his
responsibility to notify the employer as to the fact of and reasons for
his absence (CUB 611). A failure to do so which leads to dismissal
may also be grounds for disqualification for benefits even though
there may be good reasons for the absence. The rationale in such
cases is that the question is not whether there was just cause for the
absence, but whether there was justification for not notifying the
employer and asking permission for the absence (CUB 1703, CUB
1704, CUB 1706, CUB 1824).
An example covering both grounds of absence-related miscon-
duct is that of a labourer who had notified his employer of his
absence in respect of one day only on the alleged ground that his
child was ill and who remained absent without leave on the next and
the following days, on a further allegation that he was sick, thereby
losing his employment by reason of his own misconduct, as he
failed to show that notifying his employer was not required and that
he was in fact sick (CUB 2330).
Tardiness, being analagous to absence, is dealt with on much the
same basis and, consequently, it too may amount to misconduct
when it is repeated after warning (CUB 1016, CUB 1830), unless a
reasonable explanation is given (CUB 709).
The drinking of intoxicating liquor in the course of employment
and taking liquor into an employer's premises, when forbidden, is
misconduct (CUB 496, CUB 643). But a claimant was not
disqualified by reason of misconduct where he had participated in
the purchase two or three days before of the beer found on the
premises, as there was no proof that the had either brought the beer,
or intended that it should be brought there, or that he had partaken
of any beer on the day in question, or that he was in actual
possession of beer while on duty, or that he was in charge of
discipline and order in such premises (CUB 1611).
By the same token, drunkenness outside working hours is
generally considered not to be misconduct unless it affects the
worker's usefulness to his employer or contravenes the employer's
rule, provided that the rule is reasonable having regard to the
employer's business and the employee's responsibilities (CUB 934,
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CUB 1065). Indeed, in all cases where a claimant loses his
employment on account of any offence which he has committed
outside the scope of his employment, the test is whether the offence
bears such a relationship to his particular kind of job as to render
him unsuitable for it (CUB 569, CUB 1044).
Even after aprimafacie case of misconduct has been established,
the claimant is always entitled to an opportunity to explain his
conduct or to disprove the validity of the allegations (CUB 550). It
has also been held that a plausible explanation by the claimant
should be accepted (CUB 709, CUB 3124).
Finally, assuming that the claimant has not been able to rebut the
prima facie case of misconduct, the Commission must prove that
the established act of misconduct was the proximate cause of the
claimant's dismissal. If a period of time has elapsed between the
occurance of the act or ommission and the date of discharge an
inference arises that misconduct was not the proximate cause of the
dismissal (CUB 1224). Conversely, some previous conduct which
has no immediate relation to the alleged reason for dismissal cannot
be used in support of a disqualification for misconduct (CUB 1079).
In summary, then, inasmuch as the proceedings leading to a
possible disqualification for misconduct are highly adjudicative in
nature, it is perhaps not surprising that the Commission, as an
administrative agency, should decide to utilize its resources for
more remunerative purposes and, specifically, to apply its benefit
control personnel to functions for which they are better suited.
One function for which theresources of theUIC are better suited is the
determination of claimants' availabilty for work.
IV. Availability
The primary section of the Act relating to availability reads as
follows:
s. 25 a claimant is not entitled to be paid benefit for any
working day in an initial benefit period for which he fails to prove
that he was either
(a) capable and available and unable to obtain suitable
employment on that day, or
(b) incapable of work by reason of a prescribed illness, injury or
quarantine on that day.
A claimant's entitlement for illness benefits under paragraph (b)
(first provided for in the 1971 Act) only lasts during his ititial
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benefit period 42 and all subsequent benefits are payable only where
the claimant is capable and available for work (ss. 33 (2) and
36(1)). This of course does not apply in the case of a female
claimant who is unable to work by reason of pregnancy and who
fulfills the provisions of s. 30(1) of the Act.
This recent concern with compensation for temporary illness and
pregnancy has underscored the traditional meaning attributed to the
notions of capability and availability for work. Clearly, a person
who is sick is incapable of working and, for that reason, unavailable
for work. Historically, on the other hand, before unemployment
insurance concerned itself with compensation during illness or
pregnancy, the relationship between capability and availability was
most often articulated inversely; that is, availability for work
necessarily demands that the claimants be capable of working.
Indeed, this manner of stating the provision has become so firmly
rooted in the jurisprudence and administration jargon of unemploy-
ment insurance that the Umpire decisions and UIC literature merely
express it as the "availability requirement", thereby incorporating
both terms into one phrase. Perhaps this little slice of history
sufficiently explains the connotations which attach to "availability"
so that the present writer will be excused from making future
reference to "both arms" of the provision.
One further point about availability which is important to bear in
mind from the outset is that in cases of unavailability a claimant is
not disqualified for benefits for three weeks as he is in cases of
voluntary separation and misconduct; rather he is merely disentitled
to receipt of benefits for "any working day" (or number of days)
for which he fails to prove that he was available for work. In this
sense, availabilty is an ongoing requirement and one which,
consequently, is continuously monitored by the Commission.
Because of its continuity, the availability requirement is the one that
most effects claimants; indeed, the question of availability has
consistently been the basis for the largest number of denials of
benefits. 43 This being the case, it is necessary to determine what the
42. The determination of the duration of a claimant's initial benefit period varies
with the number of weeks of employment he had before separation. See ss. 17, 18,
19, 20, 21, and 22 of the Act and Canada Unemployment Insurance Commission,
Guide to the New Unemployment Insurance (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971) at
7-10. See also, Bill C-69, ss. 4 and 5, cls. 4 and 5, Ist Session, 30th Parliament,
23-24 Elizabeth II, 1974-75.
43. Although no statistics are available on this point, officials at the UIC District
Office for Nova Scotia assured the present writer that this was the case. Also,
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nature of the availability requirement is and how it is administered
by the Commission.
Regulations under the Act state the availability requirement
simply as follows:
a claimant fails to prove that he is available for work and
unable to obtain suitable employment on each working day in a
period if he fails to prove that during that period he made
reasonable and customary efforts to obtain employment. (Reg.
145(9), as amended by SOR/71-324; SOR/72-113; SOR 72-221;
SOR/75-67.)
Further elucidation as to the nature of availability can be found in
Umpire decisions. One of the most recent and informative of these
decisions stated that:
According to the jurisprudence established in matters of
unemployment insurance, it is generally considered that a person
is available for work, according to the interpretation given to the
terms of section 25(a) of the Act, if that person is prepared to
accept without delay and undue restrictions any suitable
employment that may be referred to him. This presupposes,
among other things, that the person sincerely wants to work, that
he has made personal effort to find work and that the conditions
on which he is prepared to accept work are not so difficult from
every point of view, having regard to the labour market and all
the circumstances of his case, (transportation, hours of work,
wages, etc.), that it becomes practically impossible to find him
work or to find work himself (CUB 3173).
Three salient points come out of the authorities just quoted. The
first is that the test as to whether a claimant is available for work is
largely subjective in nature. Indeed, Umpire decisions have held
that whether or not a claimant is available for work depends largely
on his intentions and his mental attitude toward accepting
immediately any employment for which he is suited (CUB 2966,
CUB 3196).
Secondly, the onus of proving availability rests with the claimant.
Again, Umpires have repeatedly stated that s. 25(a) places a
statutory duty on claimants to prove that they are available for work
(CUB 852, CUB 1515, CUB 2033, CUB 2338). One may well
Canada Unemployment Insurance Commission, Digest of Benefit Entitlement
Principles: Technical Handbook Number 8, supra, Note 33 and Decisions of the
Umpire, supra, note 33 contain more cases on the issue of availability than on all
other areas discussed in this paper combined. See also: L. Williams, Eligibility for
Benefits (1955), 8 Vand. L. Rev. 286 at 292 for a statement that the same situation
obtains in the United States.
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wonder why such an evidentiary burden would be placed on the
supposed beneficiaries of modem social legislation. Writing of this
onus as it applies to American unemployment insurance schemes,
one writer has remarked:
... courts have announced that a claimant has the burden of
proving that he is entitled to benefits. The introduction of this
legislation concept into a social program designed to alleviate, in
some small measure, the distress of unemployed people, seems
regrettable. Claimants in general not only do not understand the
legal theory of burden of proof, they do not even understand the
legal concept of availability.44
Thirdly, phrases like "reasonable and customary efforts" and
"all the circumstances of his case" have traditionally been
considered to be within the bailiwick of the common law courts;
institutions which are accustomed to hearing a lot of high-priced
barristers spend hours and days applying and distinguishing with
care the nuances of such well-worn and precedent-laden tests. Of
course, that is not to say that a Federal Court Judge sitting as an
Umpire is not equally capable of properly administering these
individualized standards. The real problem as far as this writer is
concerned is how the UIC, which is essentially a bureaucratic
institution, can fairly apply the same standards to a plethora of
claimants in the first instance. Predictably, the answer has been,
through bureaucratic means.
Since 1966 the National Employment Service has been under the
jurisdiction of the Minister of Manpower and Immigration. 45 The
purpose of the Service as stated in the 1971 Act is ". . . to assist
workers to find suitable employment and employers to find suitable
workers" (s. 140(1)). To enable this purpose to be carried out the
Commission (in conjunction with Canada Manpower) has been
given ample authority to: collect and analyse employment market
information (s. 140(2), reg. 35); register and interview applicants
for employment (s. 142, reg. 29); and require unemployment
insurance claimants to register at, report to, and carry out any
written directions of, any designated federal or provincial
government agency (s. 40(1) (c), s. 140(2) (a), s. 58(j), reg.
145(7), as amended by SOR/75-67, reg. 29(c)).
This structure and authority, coupled with the above-mentioned
burden on claimants to prove that they have made reasonable and
44. Williams, supra, note 43 at 295.
45. S.C. 1966, c. 25, S. 39.
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customary efforts to find suitable employment (reg. 145(9), supra.),
is the basis for the application of the Commission's benefit control
policy to the availability requirement. Despite this seemingly
adequate legislative mandate, at the time the Minister of Manpower
and Immigration introduced Bill C-125, it was apparently felt in
some quarters that there still existed a lacuna in the Commission's
benefit control powers. Section 11 of that Bill, had it been enacted,
would have amended the enabling section (s. 58) of the Act as
follows:
The Commission may, with the approval of the Governor in
Council, make regulations (inter alia): (c. 1) defining and
determining when claimants are capable of and available for
work, the suitability of employment offered or available to
claimants and the circumstances and facts which may indicate
capability and availability for work or suitability of employment
Considering that the bill was allowed to die with the 29th
Parliament and that it has to date not been reintroduced, it will be of
interest (at least to students of administrative law) to see if the
Commission has ever felt itself restrained, for lack of legislative
authority, in the formulation of benefit control policy relating to
availability. After setting out the Commission's policy in this
regard, we will return to a further consideration of this query.
1. Employment Market Advisory Services
Employment market information is basic to the Commission's
benefit control and related activities. As its policy manual says:
Practically all of the essentials of the entitlement determination
process, the benefit control activity, and the action resulting from
these activities are dependent on a rational appreciation of the
community, the employment opportunities it provides and the
extraordinarily variable circumstances that it presents in the
determination of a claimant's initial and continuing eligibility for
unemployment insurance benefits.
4 6
Because of the importance of employment market information,
"Employment Market Committees" have been established in each
District Office. The scope of the Committees' duties insofar as it is
relevant to this paper includes the providing of information on:
46. Canada Unemployment Insurance Commission, Manuic 1: Policy Guidelines
(amended), supra, note 14 at 1.9.
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(1) Data in the form of occupationally coded vacancy lists of
occupations or skills for which potential job vacancies exist in the
community.4
7
(2) Recommendations to the District Manager regarding who
should receive Job Search Questionnaires or interviews on job
search activities.
(3) Information regarding the prevailing rates being paid by
employers in the community in significant occupational
categories. 4
8
(4) Union-hiring hall activities and practices in the community.
(5) Recommendations to the District Manager regarding criteria to
be used by Insurance Agents in adjudicating the reasonableness of
job search activities by occupational code.
(6) Working conditions in local industries regarding assessment of
"suitable employment". 49
It is clear from the above that employment market data has a
pervasive influence over the shaping and administration of the
Commission's benefit control policy. Its influence upon "job search
activities" is of particular importance inasmuch as the Commission
has developed concrete policies in this area. Collectively these
policies are administered under what is known as the "Active Job
Search Program". As will be seen, this program is aimed directly at
enforcing the availability requirement. As far as claimants and their
availability for work is concerned, therefore, it is the inter-
relationship between employment market data and the Active Job
Search program (and especially the former's influence on the latter),
which will determine whether "reasonable and customary efforts to
obtain suitable employment" have been made.
Let us enquire more specially, then, into what is involved in the
Active Job Search Program.
2 The Active Job Search Program
The Commission uses the Active Job Search Program as a
systematic procedure in support of claimants' requirement of
47. See sample: Job Opportunity Survey, Appendix A.
48. Id.
49. Canada Unemployment Insurance Commission, Manuic 1: Policy Guidelines
(amended, supra, note 14, at 2.9 and 3.9.
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proving that they are available for work and unable to obtain
suitable employment (s. 25(a), reg. 145(9)). More specifically, the
policy manual states, the program is a formalization of the
requirement to prove availability for work through the proof that
reasonable and customary efforts to obtain employment have been
carried out.50 In short, the objective of the program is to ensure that
claimants maintain an active participation in the labour market.
In the case of a particular claimant, then, what constitutes
reasonable and customary efforts to obtain employment will be
determined a priori by designating a specific job search program,
calculated on the basis of employment market information. For
example, if a weekly job opportunity survey (in the form of
Appendix A) indicates that the claimant is not in a "demand
occupation", one of two types of procedures will be adopted.
On the one hand, if the demand for the claimant's occupation is
seasonal in nature or if for some other reason there is no
employment available in the area where the claimant usually earns
his livelihood, no personal job search might be required. In that
case, the claimant will be deemed to have satisfied the availability
requirement by simply signifying on bi-weekly reporting cards that
he is available for work. 51
Alternatively, if employment in the claimant's usual occupation
is absolutely scarce or does not exist, or the claimant is limited in
his search because of age, health, or other circumstances
necessitating a change of occupation, he will be required to search
immediately for work in other suitable employment. In other words,
he will not wait for the lapsing of the period considered reasonable
under normal circumstances but will commence immediately his
search for work in another occupation and at a progressively
reduced rate of wages. 52 To satisfy the availability requirement in
these circumstances the claimant will usually be required to fulfill
the terms of, and make an attestation to, an Active Job Search
Statement in the form of Appendix B.
For those claimants in demand occupations, a similar job search
program will be initiated from the time the claimant applies for
benefits. However, unlike the claimant in a non-demand occupation
or one who for some of the other reasons mentioned above is
required to seek employment in another line of work, the claimant
50. Id. at 3.32
51. Id. at2.32 and4.32.
52. Id. at3.32.
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in a demand occupation will be permitted to restrict his search,
during the initial phase of the program, to his usual occupation and
usual rates of pay. After a reasonable period of time has elapsed (s.
40(3)), the claimant will be required to seek employment in other
occupations and at progressively lower rates of pay. Commission
policy on this matter is that an unskilled worker has three weeks to
seek work in his usual occupation and at usual rates of pay. A
skilled worker has three weeks plus one week for each year of
employment in a skilled job to the maximum of thirteen weeks for a
grand total of sixteen possible weeks. 53 This policy is illustrated
graphically by the tables in Appendix D and is explained more fully
by the rules attached thereto.
The specific requirements placed on all the above-mentioned
types of claimants who are placed in active job search programs are
measured in terms of "contacts" he makes with prospective
employers. The number of contacts required depends upon the
opportunities for employment in the area, the particular type of
occupation, the specific conditions of employment, and the time of
year, all of which, of course, are predetermined on the basis of
employment market data. For example, if there happens to be only
one employer in the area, it would be sufficient if the claimant
"contacts" the employer once a week or maintains an active
application. On the other hand, if there are 100 employers in the
area employing workers in the claimant's skill, he might be required
to make more numerous and diversified contacts, possibly 3 to 5 a
week.
One major substitute for the active job search program is the use
of union hiring halls. Each District Manager is directed to seek
special arrangements with hiring halls whereby, if the latter agrees
to meet set criteria, it will be recognized by the Commission on that
basis as an employment agency. 54 The set criteria are met when the
hiring hall agrees to a system of providing information, known as
"special control reporting", to the Commission. 55 Thus, claimants
who normally obtain their employment through a hiring hall with
which special arrangements have been made are not required to
participate in any UIC job search program whatsoever.
53. Id. at5.32.
54. Id. at 8.32.
55. According to the Nova Scotia District Manager, special control reporting
arrangements have been made with 7 of the 14 Halifax-Dartmouth hiring halls
representing the construction trades.
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Even in cases where arrangements have been made, registration
for employment at the union hiring hall will be considered a
"reasonable" search for a limited time. On completion of such
limited period, where potential job vacancies are identified outside
the hiring hall, claimants will be required to carry out the active job
search in addition to registration with the hiring hall.
56
Other claimants who do not have to participate in an active job
search program include:
(1) Those referred to a job vacancy under the CMC/UIC Job
Referral Program.
(2) Those attending an occupational training course upon referral
by an insurance agent.
(3) Those subject to recall with their former employers within six
weeks of their interruption of earnings
(4) Those who have been disqualified, until the termination of the
disqualification. 57
Where a claimant is subject to an active job search program and
fails to live up to its terms he may be disentitled from the receipt of
benefits on any of the relevant grounds, such as failure to follow
written directions or failure to report for an interview. The policy of
the Commission is to have agents contact the claimant with a view
to correcting the deficiency instead of imposing a disentitlement
straight away.
58
Reviewing the observations made above regarding the subjectiv-
ity, onus, and tests of the availability requirement in light of UIC
benefit control policy relating thereto, it would seem that in all but
the really contentious cases those three potentially sticky legal
issues have largely been supplanted by an administrative regime
designed to deal with large numbers of claimants on an objective
basis and in accordance with employment market realities.
The interesting question from the lawyer's point of view is
whether that administrative regime is full authorized under the Act.
This of course brings us back to the query arising out of the death of
Bill C-125 on the order paper. If section 11 of the Bill had been
enacted, there probably could be no dispute as to the Commission's
56. Canada Unemployment Insurance Commission, Manuic 1: Policy Guidelines
(amended), supra, note 14 at 8.32.
57. Id. at 9.32
58. Id. at 7.32.
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authority in relation to the policies it has developed to govern the
availability requirement. As it stands, however, there appears to
have been at least one problem arising out of the practice adopted.
Section 40(3) of the Act provides inter alia that a claimant is
obliged to accept employment of a kind other than employment in
his usual occupation at a lower rate of earning if, after the lapse of a
reasonable period of time, he is still unemployed. Nowhere else in
the Act or Regulations is "a reasonable period of time" defined or
given further elucidation. Quite naturally, therefore, in order to give
its insurance agents some guidance in this regard, the Commission
has developed the so-called "3 and 16 rule" elaborated upon in the
tables and rules contained in Appendix D.
While both the District Manager and Chief Operations Officer of
the local district UIC office have assured the present writer that the
3 and 16 rule is only used as a guideline and is not considered to be
binding either on the Commission or on the claimants, in terms of
legal theory it could still be considered as "secret law".
In short, the point is that if BillC-125 had been enacted, the 3 and
16 rule would probably have been deemed to be a statutory
instrument within the meaning of section 2(1)(d)(i) of the Statutory
Instruments Act 59 and would thereby have been required to be
published in the Canada Gazette pursuant to section 11(1). As it is,
the rule is not only exempt from publication but is also most likely
saved from invalidity under section 2(1)(d)(v) as being an
instrument whose contents are limited to advice or information
intended for use or assistance in the making of a decision.
The only area which remains to be discussed is that relating to
disqualification for benefits for refusal of suitable employment.
V Refusal of Suitable Employment
Happily, a number of major issues touching refusal of suitable
employment have already been dealt with both in connection with
voluntary separation and misconduct and availability. Specifically,
the rationale for denying benefits to claimants who refuse suitable
work is the same as for voluntary separation or misconduct - the
claimant is not deemed to be unemployed through no fault of his
own. Moreover, the penalty for refusal of suitable employment is
the same as for voluntary separation and misconduct, namely, a
three week disqualification under section 43(1).
59. S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 38.
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More recently, in connection with the availability requirement,
discussion was focused on the effect of the lapse of "a reasonable
interval" (s. 40(3)) as it relates to the suitability of employment.
The benefit control function 60 as explained in the "availability
requirement" portion of the paper also applies with equal force to the
claimant's duty "to apply for a situation in suitable employment
that is vacant. . . . " (s. 40(l)(a)).
Considering the overlap between topics, the present discussion
will be limited to a consideration of the "offer" of employment and
two of the basic labour standards protections given the claimant in
this regard.
As a general rule, a claimant will be disqualified for benefits if he
has been notified of a situation or if it has been offered to him. But
notification of employment opportunities must be clearly stated.
Hence, a disqualification was not upheld where the evidence
regarding the notification or offer was incomplete (CUB 2019, CUB
2152). Similarly, the posting of a notice by an employer of possible
work in another mine was held not to be a notification when it was
vague in several respects (CUB 31). But word left by the
employer's messenger at the home with the claimant's father was
adequate notification (CUB 949).
Providing that it contains sufficient information to convey to the
claimant particulars of the employment, notification may be
communicated in various ways. For example, oral notification by an
officer of the Commission, an officer of a Manpower Centre, or by
an employer, is sufficient (CUB 899). Notification by telephone is
also recognized as a proper means of communication (CUB 2072)
and in cases where a claimant alleges that he did not receive a
telephone message, a presumption arises that he was duly notified
until his contention is borne out by satisfactory evidence (CUB
878).
In the case of offers or notifications sent by mail, under section
120(2) of the Act, the fact of mailing is evidence that it was received
in the ordinary course of the mails (CUB 1898). Where a claimant
fails to receive notification because of a change of address, he may
be disentitled for failure to make his claim in the prescribed manner,
as from the date that his change of address should have first been
reported (CUB 1501, CUB 1669, CUB 1705). But a claimant had
good cause for failing to apply for a situation when the letter of
60. See exemption No. (1)illustrated in text accompanying note 57.
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notification was received by him after the time set therein to apply
for the position (CUB 1529).
However, in all cases, claimants should know that they are likely
to receive a call for work and should so arrange their affairs that any
communication is immediately brought to their attention (CUB 355,
CUB 511).
Section 42 of the Act provides inter alia that no claimant is
disqualified from receiving benefits by reason only for his refusing
to accept employment if in accepting the employment he would
lose the right to become a member of, to continue to be a member
and to observe the lawful rules of, or to refrain from becoming a
member of any association, organization or union of workers.
Another related protection is that a claimant need not accept
employment arising in consequence of work attributable to a labour
dispute (s. 40(2)(a)). For this section to apply, however, it must be
established that there was an appreciable stoppage of work
attributable to a labour dispute (CUB 1104). Also, it must be clear
that the stoppage has not ceased and that the offer of employment
did in fact arise in consequence of the stoppage. (CUB 1104).
VI Conclusion
In this paper we have seen that the unemployment insurance
scheme is based on the philosophy that compensation should only
be paid to those persons who are unemployed through no fault of
their own. Draconian application of this principle has, however,
been mitigated by administrative realities which have obliged the
Unemployment Insurance Commission to take a selective approach
in the enforcement of disqualification and disentitlement provisions.
The Commission has also found it necessary to de-emphasize
disqualifications for misconduct because of proof problems.
In the area of availability, Commission policy reigns supreme.
The large number of claimants and the dictates of labour market
conditions have necessitated the crystalization of the legal tests of
availability into an administrative regime operating under the style
of the Active Job Search Program.
In terms of proposed amendments, Bill C-125 would have
produced two significant changes, one desirable and one not. The
desirable change would have been in the form of an addition to the
enabling clause of the Act which would have given the Commission
the authority and the duty to convert some of its directives into
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regulations. The undesirable change would have been the extension
of the disqualification period far beyond any other disqualification
period in the history of the Canadian unemployment insurance
system. 61
Perhaps the most important general point which can be made
about unemployment insurance, as far as the lawyer is concerned, is
that on the whole it is an administrator's game and one which can
most successfully be played by his rules.
61. The presently proposed amendment, Bill C-69, s. 16, will if adopted,
re-extend the disqualification period to the pre-1971 position of six weeks.
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APPENDIX A
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ACTIVE JOB SEARCH STATEMENT
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Appendix C 0 A
NOTICE OF OtSENTITLEMENT ..
Under Se-. 25(a), 32(2) and 360(1) of the
Unemploymeot Imurance Act oinencesoc
and
Under Regulation 145(9) of the
Unemployment Insurance R gulatons
correspondene regardiop your claili and
send all etters tothe above ofice.
The information that you have presented to suppoit your ctaim for benefit indicates that you hove not met the requirerments for
entistement under Sections 25(a). 33(2) ad 36() of the Unemployment Insurance Ant. and Section 14519) of the Unemployment
Insurance Regulation. The Act states that an insured person is not entitled to receive benefit for any day for which he cannot prove
that he is capable of and availasle for work. Section 145(9) of the Regulations requires that an inmured person prove that a reasonable
and customary effort to obtain employment has been made. Benefits are not payable to you, therefore, for the period
tso benuse you have not proven that ca are available
for work in tvt yo bave not nade reasonable and customary efforts to obtain work as
required by Section 145(9) of te aeglationo and Section 25(A) of the dn~aploy.ont
Insurance mt. Cur records snow that you have only ode - attempts to obtat caploy-
cet in tae past month, it is Mown tistere are employers in y ar area wstre tiore are
opportunities in your skilLs. Tnrefore, in order for you to prove entitlemenz to
further bonefits, yo will be reavvired to prove yo have made sincere efforts to fidx
ior&.
If you have further information or documentary evidence which might affect this decision, please forwardthis informationtous
without delay. If you disagree with our decision to stop paying you benefits, you have the right to appeal this decision to a Board of
Referees. If you wish to do so, please read the ristructions enclosed with this notice.
It is in your rnterest to conrinue to complete and mall your report forms, if you do not, you risk loing any benefits eo which you
might otherwise be entitled. If you do appeal, and you are successful, me wil requirm drese report cards to be completed before we car
pay you bnefits for that period.
Vouct truly,
Ns ar Tile)




Appendix z (Table 1), as amended, July, 1974
"SUITABLE" RATE OF PAY
Skilled Occupation or Vocation - Potential Jobs Available
Assuming that $100 is claimant's usual earnings and $70 is
the prevailing rate
Weeks of Unemployment
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16Years
in 0-1 0o 95 qo s 5  o 75 70Skill 1-teo 95 90? ZSo 75 70-
2 - oo 95 o~0 Sgo75, 70
2 ,oo 9s qo 5 o 75 70
3 /00 9 9og5 80 95 70
5 -' - /00 95 o YS 807 7o
5 -too qg 90 *s so ?s '20
6 /00 95 90 95 fo 75 70-
- /00 q5' 90 05 0 75 ?o
8_ /oo 95 Yo e5' Y6 75 70
-- 009 Y 90 85 go 7X70
10, /00 VS 9 0 85 go 75 70
./00 95 90 85,so 75 7o
12 /00 95 90 85 o 75 7b
/o q54 9o 5 So 75 70
Rules
(1) A claimant must be given a "reasonable period of time" to
find employment at his usual rate of pay.
(2) Determination of a "reasonable period of time" would take
into account:
(a) the years of experience in the skill
(b) the duration of unemployment excluding the period
during which the claimant had withdrawn from the
labour market for reasons beyond his control, e.g.
illness, maternity, imprisonment etc.
(c) the opportunities of employment in his area
(3) All skilled workers are allowed a 3 week bssic period
commencing with their unemployment to permit them to
seek work at their usual rate of wages.
(4) One week for each year of experience in his usual
occupation is added to the basic 3 weeks up to a maximum
of 13 weeks for a total of 16 weeks.
(5) Following the reasonable period defined above, the
claimant must be prepared to search for and accept em-
ployment at a wage rate progressively reduced by 5 per
cent per week but never lower than the rate recognized
by agreements or where there is no agreement, by good
employers.

















Appendix D (Table 2), as amended, July, 1974
"SUITABLE" WORK
Skilled Occupation or Vocation
Weeks of Unemployment
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Claimant must extend his job
search to include other occu-
pations at progressively
reduced rates of pay not lower
than the prevailing rate of
earnings in those other occu-
pations
Claimant may restrict his job
search to usual occupation at
previous rate of pay
Rules
(1) A skilled worker must be given a "reasonable period of
time" to find employment in his usual occupation before
he is expected to look for work in another occupation
or at a rate of wages lower than his usual earnings.
(2) Determination of a "reasonable period of time" takes
into account:
(a) the duration of the period of employment excluding
the period during which the claimant had withdrawn
from the labour market for reasons beyond his control.
(b) the opportunities of employment in the area.
(c) the extent of decrease in wages
(3) All skilled workers are allowed a 3 week basic period
commencing with their unemployment to permit them to
seek work at their usual rate of wages.
(4) One week for each year of experience in his usual occu-
pation is added to the basic 3 weeks up to a maximum of
13 weeks, to a total of 16 weeks.
(5) After a reasonable period of time as defined above has
elapsed, employment in the claimant's usual occupation
will be considered suitable even if it is at a rate of
earnings lower than he made previously if:
(a) it is at a rate progressively reduced by 5 per cent
per week.
(b) it is within the prevailing rate for that occupation.
c it is at conditions as favourable as those recognized
by an agreement or where there is no agreement, by
good employers.
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Appendix D (Table 2), continued
(6) Similarly, after a reasonable period, employment in
another occupation and/or at a lower rate of earnings
wou=nevertheless be suitable:
(a) if the working conditions are as favourable as those
recognized in agreements or where there is no agree-
ment, by good employers.
(b) if the rate of earnings is within the going rate for
that occupation.
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Appendix D (Table 3), as amended, July, 1974
"SUITABLE" RATES OF PAY
Unskilled Labour - Fotential Jobs Available W'ithin
Reasonable Distance Within Capability of Claimant
Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
100 100 100 95 90 85 80 75 70 70 70 70
The Table assumes that 3100 is his usual wages and $70 is
the prevailing rate.
Rules
(I) An unskilled worker must be given a "reasonable period
of time" to find employment in his usual occupation before
he is expected to look for work in another occupation or
at a rate of wages lower than that he previously received.
(2) A "reasonable period of time" excludes any period during
which the claimant had withdrawn from the labour market
for reasons beyond his control; e.g. illness, maternity,
imarisonment etc.
(3) All unskilled workers are allowed a 3 week basic period
commencing with their unemployment to permit them to seek
employment at their usual rate of wages. (This would
exclude periods following separation in respect of which
the claimant receives his usual remuneration.)
(3) Following the reasonable period defined above, the claimant
must be prepared to search for and accept employment at
a wage rate progressively reduced from his previous wage
by 5 per cent per week but never to a rate lower than the
prevailing rate.
Note: Years spent in an unskilled occupation are not a con-
sideration when determining the reasonable period of time.
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Appendix D (Table 4), as amended, July, 1974
"SUITABLE" WORK
Unskilled Occupation or Vocation - Potential Jobs
Available Within Reasonable Distance In Occupation or Vocation
Weeks of Unemployment
Years in
Occupation 1 2 3
0 - up Claimant may Claimant must extend his
restrict his job search to include
job search to other occupations at pro-
usual occupa- gressively reduced rates
tion at pre- of pay not lower than the
vious rate of prevailing rate of earnings
pay- of those other occupations.
Rules
(1) An unskilled worker must be given a "reasonable period of
time" to find employment in his usual occupation before
he is expected to look for work in another occupation or
at a rate of wages lower than he previously received.
(2) Determination of a "reasonable period of time" takes into
account:
(a) the duration of the Period of unemployment excluding
the period during which the claimant had withdrawn
from the labour market for reasons beyond his control.
(b) the opportunities of employment in the area.
(c) the extent of decrease in the wages.
(3) All unskilled workers are allowed a 3 week basic period
commencing with their unemployment to permit them to seek
work at their usual rate of wages.
(4) After a reasonable period of time as defined above has
elapsed, employment in the claimant's usual occupation
will be considered suitable even if it is at a rate of
earnings lower than his usual earnings if:
(a) it is at a rate progressively reduced by 5 per cent
per week.
(b) it is within tne prevailing rate for that occupation.
(c) it is at conditions as favourable as those recognized
by an agreement or where there is no arreement, by
good employers.
(5) Similarly, after a reasonable period, employment in another.
occupation and/or at a lower rate of earnings would
nevertheless be suitable:
(a) if the working conditions are as favourable as those
recognized by agreements or where there is no agree-
ment, by good employers.
(b) if the rate of earnings is within the going rate for
that occupation.
